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EMPLOYMENT LAW AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
OVERVIEW
A two-year legislative struggle to reform civil rights legislation
ended last November 21st when President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 19911 (the Act) into law. Unfortunately, the Act's unanswered
questions have moved the struggle from Congress to the federal judici-
ary. The next few years are likely to be highly charged in the area of
employment discrimination law. Prior to the Act the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied on a number of Supreme
Court decisions that afforded increasingly cold treatment to plaintiffs al-
leging employment discrimination. Congress responded to these deci-
sions with an omnibus act amending nearly every civil rights law,
including the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964,,the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1976, and the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of
1976. The Act's key sections greatly expand legal options and remedies
available to plaintiffs facing intentional discrimination by providing
compensatory and punitive damages, and particularly, jury trials. 2 This
Survey begins with a discussion of the issue of retroactive application of
the Act, a growing point of division among federal courts, and then fo-
cuses on recent Tenth Circuit decisions applying Supreme Court case
law recently overturned by the Act.3 This Survey then analyzes the ef-
fect of the Act's amendments on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 4 which was instead to alter standards in both disparate treatment
and disparate impact cases. In addition, the Survey reviews amend-
ments to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (section 1981).5
I. RETROACTIVITY OF THE ACT
While an early decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, Hansel v. Public Service Co.,6 matched the Bush ad-
ministration's opposition to retroactive application, a growing split
among federal courts suggests that the Supreme Court may ultimately
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
2. See Ambiguities in Civil Rights Law Still Must Be Resolved By Courts, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 238, at C-1 (Dec. 11, 1991) [Hereinafter Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238].
3. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Ward's Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
6. 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991)(refusing to consider compensatory and puni-
tive damages as allowed under § 102 of the Act). Upon signing the Act, President Bush
called for federal agencies to follow the interpretative guidance of senate minority leader
Dole (R-Kan.). President Bush's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 226 at D-1 (Nov. 22, 1991). Senator Dole's statements show concern with
retrospective application of the Act and specifically show a belief that the Act is limited to a
prospective application. Justice Dep't Brief on Issue of Retroactivity of 1991 Civil Rights Act in
Case of Van Meter v. Barr, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at F-3 (Dec. 4, 199 1)(citing 137
CONG. REC. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 199 1)(statement of Sen. Dole)).
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be required to resolve this issue. As of this writing (Jan. 30, 1992), at
least three courts have applied the Act's new standards and remedies to
cases pending on November 21st, 7 while two other courts agreed with
the Colorado district court and rejected retroactive application.8 Courts
disagree over whether the Act is to be retroactively or prospectively ap-
plied in the absence of clear congressional intent. Section 402(a) of the
Act states that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and
the amendments made by the Act shall take effect upon enactment." 9
The Act is silent, however, as to its retroactive application to cases pend-
ing at the time of enactment. Inquiry into legislative history reveals little
more than a split on the issue between republican and democratic
senators.
0
The Supreme Court fueled the controversy over retroactive applica-
tion by inconsistently handling the retroactivity issue. Just two years
ago, in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno," the Supreme Court
acknowledged its inconsistent precedent regarding a statute that is am-
biguous as to retroactive application. 12 One line of cases suggests the
judiciary disfavors retroactive application and that a statute will not be
retroactively applied unless statutory language requires otherwise.'
5
Another line of cases applies a statute to pending cases unless there is a
clear congressional intent to the contrary, or unless application of the
7. Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991)(applying §§ 101 & 105 of
the Act to disparate impact and § 1981 claims); see Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distributions Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19380 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 30, 1991) (applying § 113 of the Act authorizing award of
expert fees); Courts in Arkansas and California Apply Civil Rights Act to Pending Cases, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 250, at A-6 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter Daily Lab. Rep. No. 250] (citing
Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distributions Inc., No. LR-C-89-912, (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 1991);
Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., No. C-88-1467, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1991)).
8. Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991) (refusing to apply damages and
jury trial found in § 102 of the Act); see New Civil Rights Law Does Not Apply to Pending Cases,
DJ Brief Maintains, 29 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1443, at 1580 (Dec. 9, 1991) (citing
James v. American Int'l Recovery Inc., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1226 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
3, 1991) (stating, without analysis, the Act does not apply to cases arising before the effec-
tive date of the Act)).
[Author's Note: Since January 1992, numerous federal district courts and courts of
appeals have wrestled with the retroactivity issue. Of the courts of appeals deciding the
question, both the Sixth and Eighth Circuit have held that the Act does not apply retroac-
tively. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992); Fray v. Omaha World
Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992). For a more timely discussion of the retroactiv-
ity issue in the Tenth Circuit, see John M. Husband & Jude Biggs, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: Expanding Remedies in Employment Discrimination, 21 CoLo. LAw. 881, 886-89 (1992).].
9. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991). Sec-
tion 402(b) adds: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, nothing in this Act
shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1,
1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983. Id. The Sten-
der court supported its retrospective application of the Act by arguing § 402(b) would be
meaningless surplusage if the entire Act were applied only prospectively. Stender, 780 F.
Supp. at 1304.
10. Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1136-37 (citing 137 CONG. REc. S15485 (Oct. 30, 1991));
Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 96.
11. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
12. Id. at 836-37.
13. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
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law would result in manifest injustice to one of the parties. 14 The
United States District Court for the District of Northern Illinois followed
this latter view in Mojica v. Gannet Co. 15 The court reviewed factors laid
out by the Supreme Court in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond 16
and found that application of the Act to plaintiff's Title VII and section
1981 claims did not work a manifest injustice. In particular, the court
disregarded defendant's alleged lack of notice that intentional discrimi-
nation carried potentially severe damages.
17
In contrast, Judge Babcock, writing the decision in Hansel, denied
plaintiff an award of compensatory or punitive damages available under
the Act despite finding an hostile work environment. 18 The court based
its rejection of retrospective application on DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-
Silas Mason Co.,19 a case in which the Tenth Circuit adopted the Supreme
Court presumption against retroactive application. The district court
appeared to limit the holding to disparate treatment cases, leaving open
the possibility of later attempts to secure retroactive application by dis-
parate impact plaintiffs.20 But as in Mojica, the court turned to prece-
dent from its own circuit when faced with legal ambiguity from both
Congress and the Supreme Court.2 1 Hence, despite conflict among fed-
14. See Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711-16 (1974);
Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).
15. Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94, 98-99 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The plaintiff, a
Hispanic female, alleged discrimination in salary and work assignments as a disk jockey as
well as a sexual harassment by several station employees. The court granted her motion to
amend her complaint demanding a jury trial and praying for compensatory and punitive
damages consistent with the Act. Id. at 95.
16. 416 U.S. 696 (1974). The factors listed by the Bradley Court include: (1) the na-
ture and identity of the parties; (2) the nature of the rights affected; and (3) the impact of
the change in law on pre-existing rights. Id. at 717.
17. Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 98-99.
18. Hansel, 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991). Victoria Hansel, an auxiliary tenderer
in plant operations of the Comanche Power Plant in Pueblo, Colorado, was subjected to
numerous physical and verbal assaults during her eight-years of employment. In 1983
Hansel filed sexual harassment charges which led to no formal disciplinary actions against
the charged employees. Judge Babcock found the level of hostility escalated after 1983
although the physical harassment ended. Id. at 1130. Hansel suffered a nervous break-
down in 1983 and was then diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Although Hansel no longer attended work and did not receive a salary, she continued to
receive employment benefits as an employee on no-time status. Since Hansel remained an
employee, the traditional remedies of Title VII-back pay and reinstatement-were denied,
and with the court's rejection of retroactive application of the Act, so were expanded rem-
edies of compensatory and punitive damages. The court awarded front pay, however, to
avoid the obvious inequitable result. Id. at 1135.
19. 911 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991) (adopting
Bowen as the law of the Tenth Circuit).
20. Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1136. The court expressed concern that § 402(b) would
be meaningless if the entire Act were read to reject retroactive application, but did not
pursue this vein. With analytical sleight of hand, the court first stressed the importance of
the Act's language. But finding the language of Act disagreeable, the court then looked to
legislative history and, finding silence there, concluded from thin air that a presumption
against retroactivity controls. Id at 1136-37. This finding went directly against the court's
earlier concern about retroactive application.
21. The Mojica court relied on the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Van Meter, 778 F. Supp. at
85 (relying on the recent holding of Alpo Pet Foods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d
958 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.)).
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eral courts, plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit will again face the DeVargas
precedent in future attempts to gain retroactive application.
II. TrrLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196422 forbids employment dis-
crimination on racial and other invidious grounds. A violation of Title
VII can be proven in two ways. 23 The first, termed "disparate treat-
ment," requires proof of intentional discrimination directed against an
individual or group. The second, termed "disparate impact," is usually
established by proof that a neutral policy has a discriminatory effect on
an individual or group. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 alters both ap-
proaches. Within the disparate treatment context, the Act allows plain-
tiffs who prove an impermissible motive in an employment decision to
obtain an injunction and recover attorney's fees even though the em-
ployer proves the same decision would have been made absent a dis-
criminatory motive. 24 Additionally, the Act greatly expands remedies
for victims of intentional discrimination in employment, including sex-
ual harassment. 25 As to disparate impact, the Act overturns controver-
sial aspects of the Supreme Court's decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. 26 Returning to Court precedent before Ward's Cove, the Act
places the burden of proving a business necessity on the employer and
not the plaintiff, once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case.
2 7
The Tenth Circuit has only partially considered the Supreme
Court's recent inroads into Title VII doctrine. While referencing those
cases in a number of decisions last year, Tenth Circuit decisions have
tended not to rest solely on the controversial aspects of Supreme Court
holdings. As a result, the Act does not dramatically challenge circuit
opinion. The circuit's jurisprudence, however, has taken the Supreme
Court's hint that employment claims are to be closely reviewed. While
the Act is likely to inspire new approaches to disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims, plaintiffs may still face barriers premised on a
generally restrictive Tenth Circuit view of discrimination claims that re-
main untouched by the Act.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
23. See 2 CHARLES A. SuLuivAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2 (2d ed.
1988).
24. The Act, § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075-76. This section modifies the holding in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
25. The Act, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-74. Discussion of these remedies is postponed
until review of section 1981 since the new remedies closely parallel remedies formerly
found only in section 1981 claims. See infra text accompanying notes 131-47. Notice, how-
ever, that remedies in the Title VII context are limited to intentional discrimination and
hence do not arise in disparate impact cases. The Act, § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075-76.
26. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The decision is overturned by § 105 of the Act. 105 Stat. at
1074-75. In § 2(2) of the Act, Congress finds the decision of the Supreme Court in Ward's
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness
of Federal civil rights protections .... Id. at 1071.
27. The Act, § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074. In § 3 of the Act, outlining its purposes, Con-
gress specifically mentions its intent to codify concepts of business necessity and "job re-
lated" found in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and decisions prior to
Ward's Cove. Id. at 1071.
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A. Disparate Treatment: Effect of Proving Mixed Motive
There is a tendency to view cases of disparate treatment as gov-
erned by single motives-either illegitimate (for example, race) or legiti-
mate (for example, ability to do a job). The classic evidentiary
framework for disparate treatment works well in such a context. The
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case; then the defendant articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision; and
finally, the plaintiff has a chance to prove the defendant's proffered rea-
son is mere pretext2 8 for hidden discrimination. 2 9 Within this frame-
work, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff and the
sequence of proof is just a useful means of organizing the presentation
of evidence.30 In contrast, where evidence establishes that an employ-
ment decision results from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate mo-
tives, another line of cases-mixed motive cases-has developed which
departs from the classic framework. In such cases, the plaintiff must first
come forward with direct evidence of discriminatory motive.3 1 By satis-
fying a higher initial evidentiary threshold than in the classic prima facie
showing, the plaintiff in a mixed motive case is advantaged by a shift of
the burden of persuasion to the defendant.3 2 The employer may sustain
this burden by showing that the same decision would have been made
absent the impermissible motive.
3 3
The Act resolves two issues made uncertain by the plurality opinion
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 4 although other issues are left still in dis-
28. Pretext cases differ from mixed motive cases in that the issue in pretext cases is
whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, are the true motives behind the em-
ployment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concuring).
29. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). This framework is
also applicable to claims of age discrimination arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d
1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). Last term, the court continued developing the evidentiary
requirements ADEA claims in Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir.
1991) (finding insufficient statistical evidence to support a prima facie case) and in Mac-
Donald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1991) (An
employee can use objective evidence, her own testimony, or evidence that she held the
position for a long period of time to satisfy the prima fade requirement of job
qualification.)
30. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
31. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (suit filed under
ADEA); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245-46 (plurality opinion). Specifically, the plurality
called the employer's burden an "affirmative defense," and further ruled that an employer
must prove its "defense" by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 253.
33. Id. at 244-45. In Price Waterhouse Ann Hopkins was denied partnership in a large
accounting firm despite a far superior record of securing major contracts when compared
with the accepted partnership candidates. While there was evidence of complaints about
her interpersonal skills, other evidence established that gender-stereotyping also affected
the partnership selection process. Id at 234-35 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618
F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985)). On remand, District Judge Gesell found that Price
Waterhouse did not sustain its burden showing that partnership would have been denied
absent consideration of Hopkins' gender. The court ordered $ 371,175 in back pay, attor-
neys' fees and promotion to partnership. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202,
1217 (D.D.C), aft'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C.Cir. 1990).
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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pute. First, circuits disagreed on the threshold showing to be required
of a plaintiff in a mixed motive case. While some courts required a
showing that discrimination was at least a significant factor in an em-
ployment practice,3 5 others required much less.36 Under section 107(a)
of the Act, when the plaintiff establishes that an impermissible reason
was a "motivating" factor in an employment practice, it is an unlawful
employment practice regardless of the existence of other factors. 37 Sec-
ond, courts differed on whether an employer could merely limit liability
or escape liability entirely by proving that the same decision would have
been made without the discriminatory motive.3 8 Section 107(b) of the
Act allows courts to grant declaratory or injunctive relief and attorneys
fees once a plaintiff establishes an impermissible motivating factor, but
prohibits an award of other damages once a defendant demonstrates the
same decision would have been made absent the impermissible factor.3 9
The Tenth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. General Lines, Inc. is likely to
continue as precedent after the Act, as it represents a similar view.
40
35. See, e.g., FadhI v. City and County of S.F., 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Kennedy, J.) (significant factor); EEOC v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d 1555, 1559-60
(10th Cir. 1989) (determining factor).
36. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (discerni-
ble factor).
37. The Act provides in full: Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice. § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (amend-
ing § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)(emphasis added). This
change resolved one point of contention among the Price Waterhouse plurality. Compare Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (Brennan,J.) (motivating part) with id. at 259 (WhiteJ., concur-
ring) (substantial factor); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same) and id. at 287-88
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (determinative factor).
38. In Bibbs, the Eighth Circuit held that once a plaintiff establishes that discrimina-
tion played any part in the employment decision, the plaintiff is entitled to some relief, if
only attorneys fees. The defendant, however, may avoid an award of reinstatement or
promotion, and backpay, by satisfying the same decision test. Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323-24;
see General Lines, 865 F.2d at 1559. In contrast, the Price Waterhouse Court rejected this latter
view and provided that the defendant may escape all liability by satisfying the same deci-
sion defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 & n.10.
39. The Act provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 703(m)
[§ 107(a) of the Act] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,
the court-(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided
in clause (ii)), and attorneys' fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributa-
ble only to the pursuit of a claim under section 703(m); and (ii) shall not award
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, pro-
motion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
§ 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (amending section 7 06(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)).
40. 865 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1989); see Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d
431, 443 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting this aspect of General Lines was rejected by Price
Waterhouse but refusing to decide Cunico on those grounds). In General Lines, plaintiffs
were discharged in retaliation for their good faith, but incorrect, objection to apparent
discriminatory employment practices. General Lines, 865 F.2d at 1557. The district court
agreed with the EEOC recommendation of back pay, but denied plaintiffs additional front
pay and reinstatement. In affirming this limited liability, the court of appeals provided
vague insight into the mixed motive framework. While the court believed the employer
had a mixed motive in terminating the plaintiffs, it did not mention direct evidence. IL at
1559. Nor did the defendants expressly establish that a same decision would have been
[Vol. 69:4
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The Act leaves unresolved how the plaintiff is to show a "motivating
factor," and leaves undefined the procedural differences between the
mixed motive and single motive disparate treatment frameworks.4 1
Mixed motive cases are triggered by direct evidence apparently unlike the
prima facie or pretext evidence required in regular single-motive dispa-
rate treatment claims. Lower courts differ on whether direct evidence
can be solely circumstantial evidence such as an employer's general dis-
criminatory comments.4 2 Past Tenth Circuit decisions have examined
direct evidence in cases where plaintiffs established discrimination as a
"determining factor." Considering an ADEA claim, the court in EEOC
v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n 4 3 found determinative evi-
dence based on firing statistics and on general discriminatory statements
made by the employer's president and other management personnel.
When a plaintiff establishes significant evidence of discrimination early
in the sequence of proof, however, the Tenth Circuit has tended to view
these as pretext cases and only recently has enunciated the "determin-
ing factor" threshold for mixed motive cases.
4 4
Ambiguity in the distinction between pretext cases and mixed mo-
tive cases is not surprising. The Price Waterhouse plurality recognized
that plaintiffs will likely allege both cases in the alternative and imposed
upon district courts the unpleasant duty of selecting one of the two the-
ories at some point in the proceedings. 45 In contrast, the Price
Waterhouse dissent argued that mixed motive cases should be treated no
differently than pretext cases and that the same burden should be placed
on the plaintiff in all disparate treatment cases.4 6 The dissent's argu-
ment, though, was based on its recommendation of a determining factor
standard and effectively sidestepped the issue of two equally influential
permissible and impermissible factors. Since the Act requires less proof
("motivating factor" rather than "determining factor"), the dissent's
made absent the discrimination. In addition, the decision limited some equitably-imposed
liability but retained the award of backpay. Id. at 1560. In contrast, where the defendant
satisfies the same decision burden under the Act, any award of monetary damages would
be denied. § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1075-76; see supra note 38 for full text of § 107(b)(3).
41. Another issue left open is the Price Waterhouse plurality's disagreement on the evi-
dentiary requirement of the defendant's same decision showing. The plurality vaguely
suggested that proof of objective criteria was necessary, stating [a]s to the employers'
proof, in most cases, the employer should be able to present some objective evidence to its
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
252 (footnote omitted). But a concurring opinion suggested an employer's testimony that
the decision would have taken place on legitimate grounds would be sufficient by itself. lId
at 261 (White, J., concurring).
42. Compare, e.g., Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529-30 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(A supervisor's comments about plaintiff's age in an ADEA claim did not shift the burden
of proof to employer.) with EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923-24 (11 th
Cir. 1990) (A decision-maker's general comment that he would not hire black people if he
were the owner was direct evidence warranting the burden-shift.); see also Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 251 (general comments based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that
gender played a part in the decision, but can be evidence that gender played a part.)
43. 763 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
44. See General Lines, 865 F.2d at 1559-60.
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12.
46. Id. at 287-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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single model view of disparate treatment should be disregarded. The
Act separates liability and remedy. While employers will be found liable
for discriminatory intent upon proof of a "motivating factor," they may
avoid severe damages by proving the "same decision" defense. As to
alternative disparate treatment claims, then, the Act also requires sepa-
ration of another element-causation. A court must recognize or reject
plaintiff's proof of a "motivating factor" before it can proceed to the
issue of liability.
1. Cunico v. Pueblo School District No. 60:47 Facts and Holding
Connie Cunico, a white woman formerly employed as a social
worker with School District 60 (District), was fired in February 1982 af-
ter working three years for the District. During this period, the District
experienced financial difficulties and instituted a reduction-in-force pol-
icy to cut its staff of social workers down to the state minimum. 48 The
policy required two measures. First, staff contracts were to be cancelled
according to seniority, and second, the percentage of minority staff em-
ployed within the District was to be maintained if possible.4 9 The Dis-
trict also followed long-term affirmative action goals. 50 After the
minimum number of state social worker positions were filled by the most
senior workers, an additional position was added specifically to retain an
African-American administrator.5 1 Plaintiff, senior to the retained Afri-
can-American employee, alleged that the District impermissibly failed to
consider her for the new position due to discriminatory motives. The
trial court found in plaintiff's favor.
5 2
On appeal, the District made two pertinent statements. It first
stated that the plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case under a dispa-
rate impact framework since she could not demonstrate that a position
was available at the time of the alleged discrimination. 53 But for the
District's racially motivated decision to create a new position for a single
employee, there would have been no open position for which plaintiff
would have been considered. Second, the defendant argued that under
a General Lines mixed-motive framework it should be able to limit its lia-
bility by showing that it had a legitimate business reason and that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of the improper pur-
pose.54 The District then alleged that its financial hardship and concern
47. 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 435.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 438-39.
51. Id. at 435.
52. Id. at 434.
53. Ic. at 440-41. The elements of a disparate treatment firing claim require the
plaintiff to show: (1) that the affected employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that she
applied and was qualifed for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite
these qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that after this rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants of similar qualification. Mc-
Donnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
54. Cunico, 917 F.2d at 442-43.
[Vol. 69:4946
EMPLOYMENT LA W SURVEY
for affirmative action policies were sufficient legitimate reasons.
To escape the prima facie requirements of a disparate treatment
framework, Judge Theis, sitting by designation for the Tenth Circuit,
first recognized that plaintiff had established direct evidence of discrimi-
natory motive and therefore was not bound to the common McDonnell
Douglas approach. 5 5 Yet the court was unwilling to return to the General
Lines mixed motive test because of the recent Price Waterhouse decision.5 6
Instead, the court characterized the case as a "pretext" case and found
that plaintiff had proved that "an impermissible consideration induced
the relevant employment decision." 5 7 Apparently, the court implied the
prima facie requirement of an available position in the District's decision
to consider a single candidate. 58 Second, plaintiff presumably rebutted
defendant's legitimate business necessity even though plaintiff's proof
did not extend past an initial presentation of evidence. The circuit af-
firmed the lower court's decision for the plaintiff, awarding back pay and
attorneys' fees and costs.
5 9
2. Cunico v. Pueblo School Distrist No. 60: An Analysis
By selecting a "motivating factor" standard for mixed motive cases,
the Act reinforces a central policy concern of Title VII in eliminating
discrimination in employment decisions even when other factors play a
role.60 By allowing limited recovery, the Act requires employers to reas-
sess whether a mixed motive decision is truly as harmless as the "same
decision" absent discriminatory motive. Yet, this protection of disparate
treatment plaintiffs hinges on the evidentiary burden of the "motivating
factor" (i.e., direct evidence test). Under its pre-Act "determining factor"
standard, the Tenth Circuit found a combination of statistical evidence
and evidence of general discriminatory statements by supervisors to be
sufficient direct evidence. 6 1 Certainly, evidence of an employer's express
discriminatory intent in policy statements, as found in Cunico, should sat-
isfy the direct evidence requirement. Whether lesser evidentiary show-
ings are sufficient is likely to be disputed in the court's next term.
Given the Act's greater protection of plaintiffs who prove an imper-
missible motivating factor, there is little doubt plaintiffs will try to trig-
ger a mixed motive analysis by alleging direct evidence of discrimination
whenever feasible. Tenth Circuit decisions have not fully embraced the
mixed motive methodology, however. As Cunico reflects, the circuit ap-
pears to prefer the pretext or single motive analysis of McDonnell Doug-
55. Id. at 441.
56. Id. at 443 n.13.
57. Id. at 443.
58. Id. at 442 (When the District made the decision to retain any social worker for a
third position, it was necessarily obligated [sic] [to] fill this position by considering only
permissible factors. (emphasis in original)).
59. Id. at 436 & 444.
60. See Mark S. Broudin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 316-20 (1982).
61. E.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir.
1985).
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las-Burdine. Given the circuit's prior requirement of proof of a
"determining factor," a preference for the analytical approach taken by
the Price Waterhouse dissenters is not surprising. The court's ambiguous
framework for direct evidence cases is troubling, however. 62 Rejecting
both the common and mixed motive approaches at different points in its
opinion, the court leaves the reader of Cunico with a series of unresolved
ambiguities.
To clarify the distinction between mixed motive and pretext cases,
causation should be specifically addressed in the disparate treatment
framework. The sequence of proof advocated by Justice O'Connor in
Price Waterhouse is a strong proposal.63 A plaintiff alleging both mixed
motive and pretext would first come forward with proof of a prima facie
case normally associated with disparate treatment as well as any direct
evidence of discrimination. The defendant would then present evidence
of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the action taken. The dis-
trict court, in view of the received evidence, would then determine
whether a Burdine or Price Waterhouse framework applied. If plaintiff fails
to prove the employer was "motivated" by a prohibited reason, the bur-
den of persuasion stays with the plaintiff, who still may attempt to show
the employer's stated reason for acting is a mere pretext. If plaintiff
establishes liability by showing a "motivating factor," the burden of per-
suading the court of a "same decision" defense resides with the defend-
ant, not to escape liability, but to limit liability to attorneys' fees.
B. Disparate Impact: Changes to the Business Necessity Doctrine
Unlike disparate treatment cases, disparate impact cases under Title
VII do not rely on proof of discriminatory intent or motive. Liability
may be established when an employer's selection process, neutral on its
face and in terms of intent, adversely affects the employment opportuni-
ties of a class protected by Title VII.64 The sequencing of proof in a
disparate impact case first requires plaintiff to demonstrate a selection
process which adversely affects a protected class; then defendant must
prove a "business necessity" for the challenged process; and, finally,
plaintiff may succeed despite the "business necessity" argument by dem-
onstrating an alternative selection process with a less discriminatory ef-
fect.6 5 Prior to the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Ward's Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,6 6 most circuits assumed that the employer held the burden
of persuasion on the "business necessity" element. 6 7 While courts dis-
agreed on the severity of that burden, it was generally held that "neces-
62. This ambiguity is equally apparent in General Lines. See supra note 39.
63. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
65. See SULLIVAN et al., supra note 23, at § 4.1 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co., v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
66. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
67. E.g., Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983); Con-
treras v. Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1982); Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981).
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sity" involved a greater showing than mere articulation of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason-the employer defense in disparate treatment
cases.
6 8
Drawing from the disparate treatment model, however, the Ward's
Cove Court explained that plaintiffs retained the burden of persuading
the court that "business necessity" did not exist. 69 Employers merely
had the burden of producing evidence of a business necessity. Further,
the Court significantly lessened the urgency of "business necessity" lan-
guage in prior opinions and found dispositive proof that "a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer." 70 The Court's controversial re-interpretation of the dis-
parate impact framework in Ward's Cove was a keen source of motivation
for passage of the Act.7 1 In response, the Act rejects the Ward's Cove
scheme primarily by returning the burden of persuasion to the employer
on whether the practice at issue is justified by business necessity. The
Act finds an unlawful employment practice if a plaintiff demonstrates an
employment practice has a disparate impact and the employer "fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity."17 2 The Act also ex-
pressly rejects Ward's Cove as a source of definition for "job related" and
"business necessity" and codifies those terms to be more consistent with
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 73 and its progeny. 74 As a result, earlier Tenth
68. For example, in Williams, the court found [t]he term 'necessity' connotes that the
exclusionary practice must be shown to be of great importance to job performance to
rebut a prima facie case.... Nor is it sufficient that 'legitimate management functions' are
served by the employment practice. Williams, 641 F.2d at 840-41 (citations omitted).
69. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
70. Id. (citations omitted). The Court went on to state [alt the same time, though,
there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the
employer's business for it to pass muster .... Id. One subsequent court rightly admitted
the business necessity defense had become a misnomer, since the defense no longer re-
quired a showing of necessity and, without the burden of persuasion, was no longer an
affirmative defense. Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
71. See supra note 25. This particular focus on the Ward's Cove decision may disserve
courts attempting to interpret the Act, however. The Act asks courts to turn back the clock
to Supreme Court decisions prior to Ward's Cove. Section 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. Yet the
Court has had occasion to reconsider the disparate impact framework in other cases. For
example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), a plurality first
attempted a "fresh" articulation of the "business necessity" defense, finding a showing of
"legitimate business reasons" sufficient to satisfy the defense. Id. at 998 (O'ConnorJ.). It
is uncertain whether Watson, and other potentially restrictive opinions, remain authorita-
tive after the Act. See Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238, supra note 3, at C-1.
72. § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074. The term "demonstrates" is specifically defined as
"meets the burdens of production and persuasion." § 104, 105 Stat. at 1074.
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. The Act § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. But see supra note 62. The disparate impact
section of the Act also contains an interpretative memorandum purporting to be the only
acceptable legislative history for the purpose of construing provisions dealing with the
concepts of business necessity, cumulation, and alternative business practice. The memo,
in its entirety, states:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Ward's Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). When a decision-making process
includes particular, functionally-integrated practices which are components of the
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Circuit decisions, such as Williams v. Colorado Springs,75 are likely to be
revived as closer interpretations of the Griggs business necessity
standard.
Despite these far-reaching steps by Congress, the Act fails to ad-
dress other key aspects of the Ward's Cove decision. Most disparate im-
pact plaintiffs succeed because the employer fails to bring forward any
evidence of a legitimate explanation for the challenged practice.
76
Therefore, shifting the "business necessity" burden to defendants does
not necessarily assist most plaintiffs. Ward's Cove has far greater effects
in increasing the threshold requirements for disparate impact and in les-
sening the role of alternative non-discriminatory practices as a secon-
dary route to recovery. Ward's Cove was a class action suit, in which
former salmon cannery workers of Ward's Cove Packing Company al-
leged a variety of hiring and promotion practices for racial stratification
between cannery positions, filled by nonwhites, and the more stable and
higher paying noncannery positions, filled predominantly by whites.
The Court increased plaintiffs' statistical proof burden in two ways.
First, a disparate impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment
practice that is challenged. 77 Second, again drawing from disparate
treatment methodology, the Court based its analysis on representation
statistics that suggest a discriminatory intent if the percentage of a pro-
tected group in an "at-issue" job is less than the percentage of the pro-
tected group in the relevant labor market.78 Since the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof at this stage, the employer may prevail merely by rais-
ing defects in the plaintiff's data.
79
Commentators argue that comparisons of the effect of an employ-
same criterion, standard, method of administration, or test, such as the height
and weight requirements designed to measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977), the particular, functionally-integrated practices may be ana-
lyzed as one employment practice.
137 CONG. REC. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
75. 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Thomas v. Metroflight, 814 F.2d 1506, 1509
(10th Cir. 1987) (The practice must be essential, the purpose compelling.)
76. See generally Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Ward's Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1989).
77. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
78. Plaintiffs rested their statistical case on the overall high percentage of non-white
workers in cannery jobs (52%) and the low percentage of such workers in non-cannery
jobs (15-17%). Id. at 652. The Court found fault with this data in three respects in particu-
lar. First, the effect of a specific employment practice was not shown. Second, drawing
from Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977), the Court held
that plaintiffs failed to make the proper comparison between the racial composition of the
at-issue jobs (non-cannery jobs) and the racial composition of the qualified population in
the relevant labor market. Id. at 650-52. The Tenth Circuit and other circuits have gone
further to restrict the comparison not only to qualified potential applicants, but also to
interested applicants. See EEOC v.J.C. Penny Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988). Third, the
Ward's Cove Court required plaintiffs to draw the relevant population from the general area
population, not just from the cannery work force. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54; see gener-
ally Player, supra note 75, at 15 n.63.
79. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 650. The Act appears to reinforce this requirement in
§ 105(a) which states: If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice
does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate
that such practice is required by business necessity. The Act, 105 Stat. at 1074.
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ment practice on a protected group with its effect on the majority group
better reveals causation.80 Because comparative statistics pinpoint an
employment practice and display its adverse consequences on protected
and majority groups, the evidence links the employment practice with
group status. This view was readily held in prior disparate impact cases.
For example, in Connecticut v. Teal,81 plaintiffs demonstrated the dispa-
rate impact of a written test on African-American applicants by showing
that fifty-four percent of African-Americans passed the test compared to
eighty percent of whites.82 In Hawkins v. Bounds,8 3 the Tenth Circuit
examined how an informal business practice, a temporary detail assign-
ment in a higher-level position, affected promotion decisions.84 Before
promotion, white employees were usually first recommended for a detail
assignment which was then accorded great weight by supervisors. The
plaintiff established a prima fade case on comparative proof that no Af-
rican-Americans were offered advance detail assignments and conse-
quently none were promoted to upper level positions.
85
Conversely, the Ward's Cove two-part requirement for causation
opened pitfalls for disparate impact plaintiffs, particularly those who
faced informal or ambiguous employment practices. Faced with a re-
quirement of identifying a specific employment practice to challenge,
plaintiffs will have difficulty isolating any one practice from informal cri-
teria used in interviews or performance reviews. Even where a single
practice is identified, the Ward's Cove focus on under-representation in a
relevant labor market obscures the causal link between employment
practice and group status. The comparison is based on the composition
of the protected group in the at-issue job and the composition of the
protected group in the relevant labor market. Like qualifications be-
tween the two groups, not the differing effects of an employment prac-
tice, become the basis of the comparison. The Court infers that because
individuals in the internal labor market and the external labor market
are similarly qualified, the only explanation for adverse impact is the
effect of the employment practice. This inference is more distant, and
more subject to dispute, than the simple use of comparison of the pro-
tected and majority groups. In the Ward's Cove scheme, plaintiffs facing
informal and ambiguous criteria will also have difficulty establishing the
relevant labor market, since determining qualifications are unclear.
Finally, the Ward's Cove decision may have a continuing effect in dis-
couraging use of the "alternative employment practices" element.
Given the stiff requirements placed on statistical proof of disparate im-
pact, some plaintiffs may be tempted to argue that the Act allows a sec-
80. See Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VI's Disparate
Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILu. L. REv. 869, 898; Elaine W. Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory
Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L.
REv. 1, 32-36 (1977).
81. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
82. Id at 443 N.4.
83. 752 F.2d 500 (1985).
84. Hawkins, 752 F.2d at 502.
85. Id. at 503.
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ondary route through nonstatistical evidence of alternative business
practices.8 6 The 1991 Act, however, adopts the Ward's Cove requirement
that the employer actually knew of and refused the alternative employ-
ment practice before the plaintiff can use the alternative employment
practice to belie the employer's claim of nondiscriminatory reasons.
8 7
Hence, this requirement rejects proof of alternatives the employer could
not have known. Additionally, plaintiffs will be discouraged from using
this alternative employment practices element because a savvy employer
can simply adopt the proposed alternative to avoid liability. The Court
further cautioned courts generally not to impose their own views on
structuring business practices.8 8 The message remaining from Ward's
Cove is that employers retain a potentially broad range of discretion to
determine the feasibility of alternative employment practices. This view
at least partially remains with the Act.
1. Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc.:8 9 Facts and Holding
Plaintiffs were long-term female employees at a Safeway vegetable
packing plant who were laid off when the plant closed in June 1984.90
The dispute centered on the formal and informal practices of Safeway's
rehiring practices. Plaintiffs, each with considerable seniority, were of-
fered an opportunity to retain that seniority for purposes of sick leave
and vacation benefits if they were able to be rehired within 30 days of
plant closure. 9 1 In rehire applications, plaintiffs indicated that they
86. Such a view is not so far-fetched. The structure of § 105(a) places the disparate
impact-business necessity elements in one subsection and the alternative employment
practices in another. 105 Stat. at 1074. The Act could be read as establishing an unlawful
practice if a plaintiff demonstrates disparate impact and the defendant fails to show busi-
ness necessity; or if the plaintiff shows the employer's refusal of an alternative employment
practice. For a proposal on the use of alternative employment practice in a variety of
factual contexts, see Julia Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The
Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
1.
87. See Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61. Section 105(a) establishes an unlawful em-
ployment practice if:
[T]he complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C)
with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to
adopt such alternative practice.... (C) The demonstration referred to... [above]
shall be in accordance with the law as it existed onJune 4, 1989 [one day prior to
Ward's Cove] with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice."
The Act, 105 Stat. at 1074. The Act is unclear on this point since while it purports to turn
back the clock on Ward's Cove, the employer-refusal requirement was not apparent prior to
that decision. It is likely that the legislature intended to erase the Court's additional re-
quirement that such alternatives be equally effective'yet cost efficient. Ward's Cove, 490
U.S. at 661; see Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238, supra note 2, at C-1.
88. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 661 (citing Furco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 578 (1978)). Again, the Act's primary focus on Ward's Cove does not prevent courts
from deriving the same principles from cases not expressly overturned by the Act. See supra
note 70.
89. 943 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1231. Plaintiffs were eight of fifteen female packers who, along with eight-
een male workers employed as warehousepersons, composed the plant's workforce. Id.
91. Id. at 1232. Safeway operates three divisions (supply plants, retail stores, and a
distribution center). The plant dosed in Denver was formerly part of the supply division.
Most plaintiffs indicated in rehire applications that they sought positions in the deli or
bakery departments of retail stores. Id. at 1232-33.
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sought full-time work and could not do heavy lifting. During the period
for rehire, however, the only available jobs either required heavy lifting
or were part-time positions, although some part-time positions would
become full-time within three to five years. 92 Of eight male plant em-
ployees seeking rehire, seven were placed in jobs. Five of those rehired
were assisted informally by the plant manager. Of thirteen female em-
ployees seeking rehire, two were placed in new jobs during the required
period. Only one of those was assisted informally by the plant man-
ager.93 Plaintiffs alleged a violation of Title VII based on both disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories.
The district court found no disparate treatment.94 Although plain-
tiffs established a prima facie case, the court accepted Safeway's legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to afford greater assistance
to relocate its former female employees, and plaintiffs failed to show
those reasons were pretextual. On the claim of disparate impact, how-
ever, the lower court found for plaintiffs stating that "a causal relation-
ship existed between the practice of inadequate counseling and the
discriminatory result." 95 Essentially, the court was persuaded by com-
parative statistics that, unlike female employees seeking rehire, male em-
ployees had received informal assistance increasing the chance of
matching their qualifications to available jobs. Since Safeway failed to
articulate a business necessity for inadequately counseling female em-
ployees, the district court ordered reinstatement, attorneys' fees, and
recovery of seniority for benefits purposes.
96
In reversing the lower court on the disparate impact claim, Judge
Anderson of the Tenth Circuit adopted various principles of Ward's Cove.
First, the court of appeals accepted that the burden of persuasion re-
mains with plaintiffs after they establish a prima fade case, although the
burden of production shifts to the employer.97 Second, following the
Supreme Court definition, the court held that business necessity no
longer required an "essential" relation to the business but was satisfied
by showing the challenged practice served "in a significant way, the le-
gitimate employment goals of the employer." 98 Finally, although a
showing of less discriminatory alternative practices might rebut an em-
ployer's business necessity showing, the court echoed the caution of
Ward's Cove against interfering with employer discretion and agreed that
this showing would be difficult. 99
92. Id. at 1234. Safeway also provided evidence that, during the rehire period, 66%
of all hired employees were women, 97% of employees hired in the deli department were
women, and 67% of employees hired in the bakery department were women. Id. All were
part-time positions.
93. Id at 1234. At trial, the plant manager testified that he assisted every employee
who approached him. Id. at 1234 n.13.
94. Id. at 1235.
95. Id. at 1236.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1243.
98. Id. at 1244 (quoting Ward's Cove).
99. Id.
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Rather than hold for the employer on the controversial issue of bur-
den-shifting, the court reversed on grounds of plaintiffs' inability to es-
tablish a prima facie case. Plaintiffs' statistical analysis failed to make the
appropriate comparisons and failed to exceed a "threshold of reliabil-
ity." 10 0 Under direction of Ward's Cove, the court compared the gender
composition of "at-issue" jobs with the gender composition of the
"qualified" population of the labor market. In other words, it used rep-
resentation statistics. 10 1 Assuming Safeway's contention that "at issue"
jobs were retail jobs sought by plaintiffs, the court found that plaintiffs
were accorded the same opportunity to gain retail jobs as new hires.
Since Safeway hired a majority of women in those jobs, a disparate im-
pact based on gender could not be established. Alternatively, assuming
plaintiffs' contention that "at issue" jobs were openings which could be
filled by laid-off plant workers, the court stated that a greater male re-
hire rate was not dispositive. Examining the qualifications of the two
groups, the court found that plaintiffs had excluded themselves from
positions secured by males by expressing preferences for no heavy lift-
ing. Since males were not disproportionately hired in retail positions
for which plaintiffs were "qualified," no disparate impact was proved.
10 2
2. Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc.: An Analysis
Much of the Tenth Circuit's incorporation of Ward's Cove principles
in Ortega is reversed by the Act. Once plaintiffs satisfy the prima facie
demands of the court, the employer receives the burden of proving
"business necessity" under the stricter standard of Griggs and Williams
that the employment practice need be more than just legitimate-it must
be a "necessity." As is apparent in Ortega, however, the threshold prima
facie evidentiary showing presents the greater barrier to disparate im-
pact claimants. By requiring proof that female plaintiffs were more dis-
advantaged by employer practices than female applicants in general, the
Ortega court required that plaintiffs show a systematic mistreatment of all
female employees, not merely a disparate impact on a particular group.
This standard is too high for a prima facie showing in disparate impact
cases. Even during the Ward's Cove period, courts disagreed whether
disparate impact cases required the use of representative statistics
l) 0 3
The extent of the prima facie burden remains uncertain after the Act.
If the Act is interpreted as a return to the relatively less precise
framework for disparate impact under Griggs, plaintiffs in Ortega would
have established their prima facie case. The district court found a le-
100. Id. at 1243 (quoting Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also
Shutt v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 934 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1991)(disparate im-
pact claim under ADEA).
101. Id. at 1244-45 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308 (1977)).
102. Id. at 1245.
103. Allen, 881 F.2d at 380 (Posner, J.) (where the group challenging the employment
practice is largely homogeneous in qualifications and the disparity in results is large, a
simple statistical comparison is sufficient to support a showing of disparate impact).
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gally significant difference between the impact of rehire counseling on
female employees and the impact on male employees. ° 4 In contrast, if
courts interpret the Act to retain a vestige of Ward's Cove, a hybrid model
could result in a strict "business necessity" requirement only after proof
of a relatively high level of impact.' 0 5 In light of the Act's censure of
Ward's Cove, this latter view is objectionable. A high threshold for a
prima facie case allows a host of discriminatory employment practices
with lesser discriminatory results to go uncorrected. Given the Act's
proscription of partial discriminatory motives in disparate treatment and
a return to Griggs's concern with eliminating "built-in headwinds"
against protected groups, 106 the hybrid interpretation would be incon-
sistent with the general purposes of the Act.
III. SECTION 1981
Since the 1976 Supreme Court decision to apply section 1981 to
private contracts in Runyon v. McCrary,10 7 this obscure Reconstruction
statute has evolved into one of the most litigated areas of civil rights.'
0 8
The section, originally intended to oppose Black Codes enacted by
Southern States after the Civil War, makes it unlawful to deny nonwhites
an equal right "to make and enforce contracts."' 0 9 Although employ-
ment contracts are commonly implicated, a variety of public and private
contracts are also litigated under the section, including school admis-
sions, housing, and commercial contracts. Prior the the Act of 1991,
given a choice between Title VII and section 1981, plaintiffs would inva-
104. Ortega, 943 F.2d at 1235. Arguably, defendants may have still prevailed on the
issue of causation since the court of appeals found that plaintiffs'job preferences, not the
selection procedure, to be the cause of that impact. Id. at 1245-46. The court's position
that disparate impact cannot be established when a majority of female applicants are hired
for an at-issue position is questionable, though. [Ain employer's treatment of other mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' groups can be of little comfort to the victims of... discrimination.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 455 (citations omitted); see Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262,
1272-73 (10th Cir. 1988) (Evidence that most promotions during a relevant period were
given to women does not establish that decisions were not made on a discriminatory
basis.)
105. Regardless of congressional intent, some would argue the resulting hybrid is a
more accurate balance between the objectives of Title VII and the need for employer dis-
cretion. The original Griggs framework created a low prima facie burden and a much
stricter business necessity requirement. A hybrid between Ward's Cove and the 1991 Act
suggests at least a logical parallel between a greater prima facie burden coupled with a
strict business necessity requirement. See Player, supra note 76, at 36-41.
106. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
107. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
108. In a 1980-81 survey of non-prisoner civil rights claims in federal districts in Los
Angeles, Philadelphia and Atlanta, § 1981 claims finished a close third behind Title VII
and § 1983 claims. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, Comment, The Importance of
Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 599 (1988).
109. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United Sates shall have the same
right in every State and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
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riably prefer section 1981 since the section required no initial exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies, 110 granted jury trials,"II and provided
both compensatory and punitive damages. 112 This preference was par-
ticularly strong in claims of racial harassment. Since a hostile work envi-
ronment need not create an economic injury-such as demotion,
discharge, or lost work time-courts were constrained from compensat-
ing harassment victims for medical and related costs because of the lim-
ited remedies available under Title VII. Litigation under section 1981,
then, became the sole route to compensatory and punitive damages for
some plaintiffs,"13 although victims of purely sexual harassment were
still denied a full remedy. 114
A. Discrimination in Terms and Conditions of Employment
Concern that expansion of section 1981 might undermine the pro-
cedural and policy objectives of Title VII led the Court to limit the sec-
tion's scope in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 1 5 Ironically, the Court
relied on the availability of remedies under Title VII to deny section
1981 coverage for racial harassment. 61 In Patterson, the Court restric-
tively read the language of section 1981 to govern only conduct involv-
ing the rights to "make" or "enforce" contracts, not postformation
conduct relating to terms and conditions of continuing employment. 1
7
The Court therefore concluded that racial harassment in the course of
employment was not actionable under section 1981.118 Similarly, the
Court reasoned, claims of discriminatory denial of promotion would not
be actionable unless the promotion offered an opportunity to enter into
110. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 108, at 602 n.38.
111. Ward v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
where Title VII and § 1981 claims were validly combined, bifurcation of the trial was nec-
essary to try the § 1981 claim before a jury and the Title VII claim before the court. See
Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1147-48 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 196
(1991); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443 (10th Cir. 1988).
112. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 108, at 601-02 n.34.
113. See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (up-
holding award of $ 25,000 compensatory damages and $ 25,000 punitive damages for
racial harassment under § 1981); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250,
1260 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding award of $ 30,000 punitive damages under § 1981 for
racial harassment), cer. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
114. Recall the case of Victoria Hansel, supra note 18. Plaintiffs have also attempted to
circumvent the remedy limitations of Title VII with state tort claims. See Baker v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment of $1.00 damages for
Title VII claim of hostile work environment plus $ 45,000 in actual damages, $ 45,000
punitive damages on claim of outrageous conduct).
115. 491 U.S. 164, 181-82 & n.4 (1989).
116. Id. at 181.
117. Id. at 176-77.
118. Id. at 179; see Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1386-87
(10th Cir. 1991). More precisely, the Court found that evidence of racial harassment alone
could not establish a § 1981 claim. The Court later agreed with the Fourth Circuit's find-
ing below that postformation harassment may be used as additional evidence of discrimi-
natory intent at the time of the formation of the contract. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 184 n.5.
Additionally, evidence of harassment could be used to show the employer's purported
legitimate intent in forming a contract was pretextual. Id. at 188.
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a new contract with the employer.' 1 9 By focusing on concern with the
integrity of Title VII mechanisms, the Court intimated that overlap be-
tween the two protections should be minimized. 120 By contrast, overlap
of the two approaches to claims of intentional racial discrimination is
maximized under the 1991 Act. The Act defines the phrase "make and
enforce contracts" to include terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship. Hence, claims of harassment and failure to promote now
fall within the scope of section 1981.121 Despite the apparent simplicity
of this definitional change, the Act potentially overturns hundreds of
federal court decisions over the past three years.
The Act additionally expands the scope of section 1981 to cover
claims of discriminatory discharge. The Patterson decision did not dis-
cuss discriminatory discharge, although nearly every circuit after Patter-
son extended its holding to negate such claims under section 1981.122
In so doing, the Tenth Circuit turned a rapid about-face from its ap-
proval of the claim just a few years earlier.' 23 Plaintiffs alleging discrim-
inatory discharge were channelled into Tide VII, which offered an
identical analytical framework under disparate treatment but circum-
scribed remedies. 124 With passage of the 1991 Act, though, courts are
likely to return to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hicks v. Brown Group 12
5
119. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185-86 (The promotion must rise to the level of a new and
distinct relation between employee and employer). Brenda Patterson was hired in 1972 as
a bank teller and laid offin 1982. During that period, she sought and was denied a promo-
tion to the position of intermediate accounting clerk, a job which would raise her hourly
wage by 89 cents. In her complaint, Patterson alleged that harassment, failure to promote,
and discharge by her employer were due to her race. On remand, the only remaining issue
involved the discriminatory failure to promote. The district court found promotion from
one hourly wage to another did not constitute a new and distinct relation and dismissed
plaintiff's claim entirely. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 729 F. Supp. 35, 36
(M.D.N.C. 1990).
120. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181-82. Some post-Patterson courts tested their recognition
of § 1981 claims on whether such recognition would subvert the integrity of Title VII. See
Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, - U.S. -, 111
S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1258 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2889 (1991).
121. § 101(2), 105 Stat. at 1071-72 (amending 42 U.S.C. 1981), states: For purposes of
this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
122. See, e.g., Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2259 (1991). But see Brown Group, 902 F.2d at 640.
123. See, e.g., McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 1988);
accord Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988); Connor v. Fort
Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1985). Moreover, this turn occurred in the face
of two district court decisions continuing to award discriminatory discharge claims under
§ 1981 despite Patterson. Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp., 748 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Kan. 1990);
Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989), rev'd, 950 F.2d 654 (10th
Cir. 1991). The Padilla court argued discriminatory termination did not involve the terms
and conditions of a contract, as precluded by Patterson, but affected the right to make a
contract. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490. Although Padilla was reversed on appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour recognized in a Nov. 26, 1991 opinion that Patterson would
soon be mooted by the 1991 Act. Padilla, 950 F.2d at 655 n.2.
124. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186-88; Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156,
1162 (10th Cir. 1991); McAlester, 851 F.2d at 1260.
125. 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
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as a bridge from pre-Patterson cases to the Act. Unlike other circuits after
Patterson, the Eighth Circuit in Brown Group found that "[i]n order to give
meaning to the right to make contracts free from discrimination, the
right to be free from discriminatory discharge must be implied."' 26 Re-
sponding to the Patterson Court's concern with the integrity of Title VII,
the Brown Group court found that recovery under section 1981 does not
subvert Title VII's procedural preference for informal conciliation. The
Patterson Court accepted overlap between Title VII and section 1981 in
discriminatory hiring cases because Title VII's informal procedures are
unworkable when the parties have yet to develop a contractual relation-
ship. 12 7 Similarly, the Brown Group court stated, discharged employees
could not benefit from conciliation because no employment relationship
remained to salvage.
12 8
In Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Center, the Tenth Circuit adopted
a per se denial of section 1981 claims predicated on postformation con-
duct. 129 Supported by Patterson and by agreement from nearly every ap-
pellate court, the Trujillo court found that section 1981 "does not apply
to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which
does not interfere with the right to enforce established contractual obli-
gations."' 3 0 In rejecting plaintiff's claim of discriminatory discharge,
the court cautioned against a tortuous construction of section 1981 to
provide a remedy for alleged discrimination already covered by Title
VII.13 1 But while the Brown Group court argued that such distortion was
not required prior to the 1991 Act,13 2 the Act's expansion and redefini-
tion of the section facilitates arguing a discriminatory discharge under
section 1981. In so doing, Congress reaffirmed a multifaceted attack on
discriminatory imposition of low wages and intolerable working condi-
tions prevalent after the Civil War and still not eliminated.'
33
B. Section 1981 and Title VII: New Remedies for Intentional Discrimination
As mentioned earlier, prior to the 1991 Act, plaintiffs were en-
126. Id. at 639 (Discriminatory discharge deprives the employee of his or her employ-
ment, the very essence of the the right to make employment contracts.)
127. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181-82.
128. Brown Group, 902 F.2d at 640-41.
129. 928 F.2d 973, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognized as superceded by statute in
Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992)). Also last term, the Tenth Circuit re-
jected, on similar grounds, a § 1981 claim that plaintiffwas subjected to intolerable work-
ing conditions for discriminatory reasons. Washington v. Board of Pub. Utils., 939 F.2d
901, 904 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991). For a view that per se rejection of postformation conduct
claim is untenable even in light of Patterson, see Caroline R. Fredrickson, Note, The Misread-
ing ofPatterson v. McLean Credit Union: The Diminishing Scope of Section 1981, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 891, 906-08 (1991).
130. Trujillo, 973 F.2d at 975 (quoting Patterson) (emphasis added by Trujillo court).
131. Id. at 976.
132. In interpreting the 1866 Act, the Brown Group court held freedom from discrimina-
tory discharge could be found within the broad right to hold and enjoy the rewards of
labor, a historically protected right in section 1981. Brown Group, 902 F.2d at 647.
133. See Washington v. Board of Public Utilities, 939 F.2d 901, 902 (A black woman alleged




couraged to seek recovery under section 1981 due to the section's
greater range of compensatory and punitive recovery. Conversely, Title
VII recovery was limited to back and front pay and certain forms of equi-
table relief, such as reinstatement. The Act raises damages for inten-
tional discrimination under disparate treatment (but not disparate
impact) Title VII claims to levels similar to section 1981. However, pre-
sumably in line with the Patterson Court's concern for the integrity of
Title VII, where the complaining party is eligible to recover under sec-
tion 1981, the party cannot seek damages under Title VII.13 4 Punitive
damages may be sought against non-government employers, although a
cap is imposed on the total amount of combined compensatory and pu-
nitive damages recoverable.13 5 Finally, plaintiffs alleging intentional
discrimination may also request jury trials. 136 With the increased public
attention to harassment in the workplace, this provision may be the sin-
gle most important change in the Act.
Despite the Patterson Court's concern for integrity of administrative
remedies in Title VII, many commentators have argued that Title VII's
inadequate remedies are a primary source of inequity in that cause of
action.13 7 Prior to the Act, a particular class of plaintiffs-women of
color-suffered unequal treatment by courts faced with divergent reme-
dial powers. An African-American woman alleging racial and sexual
harassment, for example, might attempt to bring claims under both Ti-
tle VII and section 1981. Since Patterson, the section 1981 claim would
be dismissed as post-formation conduct not covered by the scope of the
134. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072, (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981) states:
(a) Right of Recovery. (1) Civil Rights.In an action brought by a complaining
party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not
an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohib-
ited under section 703, 704, or 717 or the Act (42 U.S.C 2000e-2 or 2000e-3),
and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the Revised
Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981), the complaining party may recover compensatory and
punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized
by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent....
(emphasis added).
135. The caps are: $50,000 for employers having between 15 and 100 employees;
$100,000 for employers having between 101 and 200 employees; $200,000 for employers
having between 201 and 500 employees; and $300,000 for larger employers. The standard
for awarding punitives is demonstration that the employer engaged in a discriminatory
practice with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual. Id. at 1073. Limitations on total recovery are applied to damages
awarded under this section. Id. at 1073. Hence, it is likely plaintiffs will attempt to argue
that no such limitation is applied to pendent state law claims. See Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238,
supra note 2, at C-I.
136. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073. Amendment of Title VII may also expand the availability
of ajury trial under state statutes against discrimination which are generally interpreted to
track Title VII. See Best v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.
1991) (denying a jury trial under the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, KAN STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1001 to -1044 (1986), as a Title VII analogue).
137. See Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wal" Title VII, Section 1981, and the
Intersection of Race and Gender Rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1991)
(discussing similar language in the 1990 bill); Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relieffor Hostile
Work Environment Discrimination: Restoring Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE LJ. 1611
(1990).
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
section. Hence, plaintiff would first lose a chance to gain compensatory
damages for medical bills or for psychological counseling. 13 8 Second,
under Title VII, courts had difficulty linking racial harassment with sex-
ual harassment. Since section 1981 covers racially motivated decisions,
some courts would limit analysis of the Title VII claim to evidence of
sexual discrimination.13 9 Black women, who are subject to compound
discrimination as minorities and as women, thus would be penalized if
evidence were insufficient for either racial discrimination or sexual dis-
crimination as independent claims. 140 The split of remedies created a
legal analysis unsuited to the problem of compound discrimination.
1. Carter v. Sedgwick County:14 1 Facts and Holding
Jean Carter, an African-American female, complained under various
provisions including Title VII and section 1981. The plaintiff alleged
she was subjected to racial slurs and sexual harassment from her super-
visors and was later discriminatorily discharged from her position as of-
fice assistant in the Sedgwick County Community Corrections
Department. 14 2 The district court found in favor of plaintiff awarding
$100,000 in compensatory damages, $10,000 in punitives, $10,748.05 in
backpay and other equitable remedies for a violation of section 1981.
The district court denied recovery for gender-based discrimination
under Title VII since plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.
143
Following Patterson and Trujillo, Judge Ebel of the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the determination of liability under section 1981.144 The court
reiterated that postformation conduct, such as harassment and dis-
charge, was no longer actionable under section 1981. Since the district
court's order was issued prior to Patterson, the court of appeals re-
manded the issue of whether Title VII could sustain damages for dis-
criminatory discharge. Providing guidance, the circuit appeared to
accept plaintiff's contention that a factual finding of racial discrimina-
tion under section 1981 applied to racial discrimination claims under
Title VII. 14 5 The court concluded that, in the event the district court
established liability under Title VII, the award of back pay and attor-
ney's fees was affirmed.
14 6
138. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also Bradford, supra note 138, at
1615-17.
139. See Winston, supra note 137, at 796-98 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 797.
141. 929 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1991).
142. Id. at 1503.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1503-04. The court acknowledged Patterson was applied retroactively in the
case, but curiously noted that injustice was not done, despite vacating $110,000 of plain-
tiff's award, because Title VII still enabled plaintiffto be made whole for her injuries. Id. at
1504 n.2.
145. Id. at 1504.
146. Id. at 1507.
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2. Carter v. Sedgwick County: An Analysis
Carter demonstrates many of the unfortunate procedural hurdles
slowing courts from reaching the question of compound discrimination.
Having first determined that gender discrimination was precluded by
the administrative exhaustion requirements of Title VII, the Carter court
foreclosed the potential interaction of sexual harassment and racial har-
assment. Under this view, plaintiff had to satisfy the requirements of a
hostile environment claim to warrant a finding of gender discrimination
independently of evidence of racial harassment. Next, within the limited
context of race-based discriminatory discharge, the divergent remedies
of Title VII and section 1981 further disadvantaged plaintiff. In a case
where both courts seemed to agree that impermissible racial discrimina-
tion was present, there was no compelling rationale to award a success-
ful section 1981 plaintiff $110,000 and the Title VII plaintiff only
$11,000. Under the 1991 Act, no such division would have occured.
By equalizing damages between Title VII and section 1981, the Act
allows courts to reassess fundamental models of the interaction of race
and gender discrimination. Some consider the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Hicks v. Gates Rubber CO. 14 7 a thoughtful starting point for a new
model. The Hicks court permitted evidence of race discrimination to be
considered as additional evidence of a hostile environment giving rise to
a sexual harassment claim. 148 Whether the reverse would apply is un-
clear-for example, in Carter, whether evidence of sexual harassment
could have bolstered a claim of racial discrimination. The Hicks court
stressed that racial discrimination evidence was allowed to be intro-
duced because examination of surrounding circumstances was required
in a hostile environment claim. 14 9 The Hicks court did not use evidence
of sexual harassment to reverse the lower court finding of insufficient
evidence of a racially hostile environment. Nonetheless, this sex-plus
framework' 50 is a useful first step to the more fully developed com-
pound discrimination standard encouraged by the 1991 Act.
CONCLUSION
In a series of cases last term, the Tenth Circuit drifted further from
earlier precedent in employment law led by a blowing cold front from
the Supreme Court. A few of the circuit's decisions, such as Ortega and
Trujillo, follow the Court so closely that their reversal is soon likely in
147. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1986); see Winston, supra note 137, at 799-800 n.129
(discussing Hicks).
148. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416-17.
149. Id.
150. The origin of this framework is generally attributed to the Court in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp, 400 U.S. 542 (1971). Under this model, the Court will find discrim-
inatory treatment if an employer treats groups of males and females differently because of
an additional immutable factor. In Martin Marietta, women who were parents with school
aged children were treated differently from similarly situated men. Race is just as immuta-
ble as parentage.
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light of the 1991 Act.15 1 But the circuit's decisions, for the most part,
did not fall squarely on overturned Supreme Court cases. Moreover,
the 1991 Act is ambiguous in many areas, allowing much of the strict
review suggested by the Supreme Court to linger. In particular, the
threshold showing of disparate treatment plaintiffs seeking the advan-
tage of a mixed motive determination and the statistical threshold show-
ing of disparate impact plaintiffs remain unclear. The Act's disregard
for the Court's approach in a variety of areas suggests that lower courts
need not sharply curtail plaintiffs' access in employment cases, however.
Indeed, the Act allows courts to reconsider the employment law analyti-
cal framework in a variety of areas, such as consideration of mixed mo-
tives rather than a unidimensional approach and consideration of the
links between multiple sources of discrimination. Hopefully, courts will
accept this new project by sharing the remedial concerns central to the
Act's passage and broaden protection against unlawful discrimination in
employment.
Christopher Payne
151. While Judge Brorby of the Tenth Circuit declined to comment on the potential
scope of the new civil rights act, Trujillo was not recognized as the law in Patrick v. Miller,
953 F.2d 1240, 1251 n.6 (10th Cir. 1992).
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